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New Classical Attack Forging RSA Signatures Without Factoring

New Classical Attack Forging RSA Signatures Without Factoring

THE TECH CHRONICLE  ·  technology  ·  Thursday, October 01, 2026
New Classical Attack Forging RSA Signatures Without Factoring

The technique is fully practical against 1024‑bit RSA and degrades the security of 2048‑ and 4096‑bit keys to levels deemed unacc…

By TechPulse Blog

Researchers have unveiled a novel, classical‑computing method that forges RSA signatures without needing to factor the RSA modulus, slashing the resources required to break RSA by orders of magnitude. The technique is fully practical against 1024‑bit RSA and degrades the security of 2048‑ and 4096‑bit keys to levels deemed unacceptable.

Key Takeaways

  • A classical attack can forge RSA signatures without factoring the modulus.
  • The method makes breaking a 1024‑bit RSA key feasible in a handful of months on an academic CPU cluster.
  • Prior cost estimates for a 1024‑bit break ran into tens of millions of dollars, highlighting the magnitude of the new reduction.
  • Security of 2048‑ and 4096‑bit RSA keys is now considered unacceptable under this attack.
  • The work was led by cryptography expert Karsten Nohl of Allurity and UC‑San Diego professor Nadia Heninger.
Metric Value Why it matters
Lead researcher (industry) Karsten Nohl, Head of Innovation at Allurity Shows commercial interest in RSA security research.
Lead researcher (academia) Nadia Heninger, Professor, UC‑San Diego Bridges academic cryptanalysis with real‑world impact.
Practical break time (1024‑bit) A handful of months on an academic CPU cluster Demonstrates feasibility without massive supercomputers.
Historical cost estimate (1024‑bit) Tens of millions of dollars for a single key Highlights the dramatic cost reduction.
Affected key sizes 1024‑bit (practical), 2048‑ and 4096‑bit (unacceptable security) Impacts the majority of current RSA deployments.

What the New Attack Achieves

The breakthrough lies in forging RSA signatures without ever factoring the public modulus, a step that upends the long‑standing assumption that RSA’s security is synonymous with the difficulty of integer factorisation. By sidestepping the factoring problem, the researchers reduced the computational burden by “orders of magnitude,” making attacks that previously required massive financial outlays now achievable on modest academic hardware.

How the Method Bypasses Factoring

While the detailed algorithmic steps remain technical, the core insight exploits mathematical structures in the RSA signature scheme that allow a valid signature to be constructed directly. This approach eliminates the need for the classic number‑theoretic attack surface—namely, finding the prime factors of the modulus—and instead leverages lattice‑based techniques and clever use of the public exponent. The result is a classical, non‑quantum pathway to break RSA that operates entirely on standard CPUs.

Performance Benchmarks Compared to Traditional Factoring

On a typical academic CPU cluster, the team generated a forged signature for a 1024‑bit RSA key in “a handful of months.” By contrast, earlier estimates placed the cost of breaking the same key at “tens of millions of dollars” of computation for a single key, reflecting the expense of large‑scale factoring efforts such as the General Number Field Sieve. The new method therefore represents a shift from a high‑cost, high‑time attack to a relatively low‑cost, time‑bounded process.

Implications for 2048‑ and 4096‑Bit RSA Deployments

Although the researchers demonstrated a full break only for 1024‑bit keys, they assert that the same technique lowers the security margin of 2048‑ and 4096‑bit keys to “unacceptable levels.” In practical terms, this means that organizations relying on these larger key sizes can no longer assume a comfortable security buffer against classical attacks. The finding accelerates the timeline for migration to post‑quantum algorithms or alternative public‑key systems.

Community Reaction and Next Steps

Karsten Nohl, head of innovation at Allurity, emphasized the need to reassess RSA’s threat model, while UC‑San Diego professor Nadia Heninger highlighted the academic significance of demonstrating a non‑factorisation attack. Both researchers agree that the cryptographic community must urgently revisit key‑size recommendations and consider deploying algorithms that do not share RSA’s structural vulnerabilities.

Why it matters

The attack reshapes the security landscape for one of the internet’s foundational cryptographic primitives. Enterprises, certificate authorities, and software vendors that continue to rely on RSA for authentication, encryption, or digital signatures now face a concrete risk that is both faster and cheaper than previously thought. Monitoring upcoming standards revisions, adopting larger key sizes (where still viable), and planning transitions to lattice‑based or hash‑based post‑quantum schemes become immediate priorities.

Frequently asked questions

Who developed the new RSA attack?

The research was led by cryptography expert Karsten Nohl, head of innovation at Allurity, together with professor Nadia Heninger of the University of California, San Diego.

Which RSA key sizes are affected?

The method is fully practical for 1024‑bit RSA and degrades the security of 2048‑ and 4096‑bit keys to levels considered unacceptable.

How long did it take to break a 1024‑bit key?

The attack succeeded in “a handful of months” using an academic CPU cluster.

How does this differ from traditional factoring attacks?

Traditional attacks require factoring the RSA modulus, a process historically measured in tens of millions of dollars of computation for a single 1024‑bit key. The new approach bypasses factoring entirely, reducing resource requirements by orders of magnitude.

What should organizations do in response?

Stakeholders should re‑evaluate reliance on RSA, consider migrating to larger key sizes only as a short‑term measure, and accelerate adoption of post‑quantum cryptographic algorithms that are not vulnerable to this class of attack.

Bottom Line

A newly disclosed classical attack can forge RSA signatures without factoring the modulus, making a practical break of 1024‑bit RSA possible in months on modest hardware and rendering 2048‑ and 4096‑bit keys insecure. The work, authored by Karsten Nohl of Allurity and UC‑San Diego’s Nadia Heninger, forces a rapid reassessment of RSA’s role in modern security architectures.

Reporting based on: original source.

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